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# ROLE OF 'BLACK ARTS'

## Government's Intelligence Apparatus Is Big and Gathers Its Information From Everywhere

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Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 16 —

Ever since the highly competent spies of Joshua found shelter in Jericho with Rahab the harlot, intelligence information has had a profound impact on the course of history.

In a more recent success, the United States gathered vital information in U-2 reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union for four years until these were ended with the downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960. Still more recently Soviet long-range missiles were exposed in Cuba.

Ironically, however, the Administration's failure to identify the ICBM threat in Cuba earlier than it did has resulted in some skepticism of its current assurances that no "offensive" weapons are on the island.

Thus new arguments have developed over the effectiveness of the Government's intelligence apparatus. In these operations, untold hundreds of millions of dollars a year are spent on the so-called "black arts."

### Intelligence Board

At the pinnacle of what Government people call the "intelligence community" is the United States Intelligence Board. This consists of the representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Defense Intelligence Agency which operates under the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Intelligence Office of J-2 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Intelligence Agency, which was a super-secret cryptographic organization until the defection of two of its members a few years ago brought it into the public spotlight.

This board, of which the director of the C.I.A. is chairman, meets regularly. It prepares what is known as the "intelligence estimate" for the President and his aides.

The information that finally reaches the U.S.I.B. is gathered from all imaginable — and some unimaginable — places. The Central Intelligence Agency is responsible for clandestine operations abroad, although it often seems its conduct is as open as a daily newspaper. Nevertheless it does carry out some old-fashioned "cloak and dagger" espionage. More important, its work involves new-fangled electronic and photographic monitoring devices in

the air, on land and sea — anywhere that suits its needs.

"In this intelligence task," Allen W. Dulles, the former director of the C.I.A. once said, "intelligence technology, electronics, the aeronautical and affiliated sciences play a major role."

This was exemplified during the Cuba crisis. The man who first discerned the Soviet missile sites on U-2 reconnaissance photos taken at a height of more than 80,000 feet was Arthur C. Landahl, a 45-year-old assistant director of the C.I.A.'s Photographic Interpretation Office. He received a career service award from the National Civil Service League.

### Gathered Openly

But there is more to intelligence work than the C.I.A.'s not so secret operations and the gadgetry of modern technology. The intelligence experts gather all kinds of information — social, political, economic and cultural as well as military. And most of this is in the open.

The conversations of an American ambassador in Moscow or elsewhere provide information for the intelligence experts. The studies of the scientists of the Atomic Energy Commission also provide intelligence material. So do the reports of a military attaché who carefully watches a parade of foreign troops.

Just as important as these sources are the cullings from foreign newspapers and broadcasts, particularly the texts of major speeches and editorials.

How effective are the intelligence operations? That depends on the kind of information one has in mind. The Soviet Government for example is

vague and uncertain in its human beings and human decisions. There are always scores of intangibles and unpredictable, and in fact "unknowables."

Again the Cuba affair provides an example. Many experts in the "intelligence community" had studied the Soviet interest in Cuba and speculated on the possibility of Moscow turning the island into a missile-launching site.

### The Experts' View

But, these experts reasoned, such a Soviet base would soon be exposed and Moscow would be forced inevitably to retreat in ignominy. Why should she take the risk?

It was this kind of seemingly logical reasoning last summer that blurred the significance of the evidence of growing Soviet military shipments to Cuba; the evidence of increasing numbers of clusters of surface to air missiles.

As Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara has testified to the House Armed Services Committee, refugees had been reporting the existence of missile bases in Cuba. But aerial reconnaissance based on refugee reports either disproved the presence of missiles or linked suspected activity to surface-to-air missiles, or cruise-type missiles that posed no offensive threat to the United States.

Afterward, further reconnaissance revealed that many of the surface-to-air missiles were grouped to protect the long-range missile bases.

The Cuba experience, therefore, in the opinion of many observers reaffirmed an old truism about intelligence. It is not that the intelligence materials are not available. Frequently much of it is. The critical problem is what is done with it.



The New York Times

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Director of C.I.A.

far less cooperative than the United States in the quantity of military, industrial, economic, and just general statistical material it makes available in official publications.

Nevertheless intelligence officials find they can amass much important information even in the military field. This is true of Russia and China, as well as small Communist countries such as Cuba.

What is more difficult to obtain — and highly important — is the political thinking within the various Communist hierarchies. What premises are accepted by them for their day-to-day, month-by-month, year-by-year objectives?

As Mr. Dulles said, "Intelligence will never be an exact science. It deals not only with the hardware of national power and of battle, but with the